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EXPOSING THE LOANSHARKS IN SHEEP'S
CLOTHING: WHY RE-REGULATING THE




Roughly twenty-seven years have passed since the "deregulation"
of the credit industry began in America.1 During this time, personal
savings rates have plummeted, bankruptcies have increased seven-
fold,2 and a fringe credit industry3 has emerged that regularly makes
short-term loans at triple-digit interest rates twenty times higher than
those charged by credit cards. This Note will demonstrate that the
high rates charged by fringe creditors are the result of market failure,
not informed bargaining between rational actors. Inadequate disclo-
sure and limited financial education prevent consumers from under-
standing the full cost and risk of the loans they take out, leading to
poor resource allocation. 4 Furthermore, short-term, high-rate credit
imposes significant costs on society. This Note argues that the protec-
tion of society from these externalities justifies government interven-
tion, even in the rare case where consumers understand the full
implications of their decisions.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.S., Kansas State
University, 2002. Special thanks to Professor Vincent Rougeau and Professor Judith
Fox for helpful comments, to Erin Gallagher for providing encouragement when it
was needed most, and to all of the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
support and dedication.
1 The deregulation of interest rates began with the Supreme Court's holding in
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978), described
infra Part IV.A.
2 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
3 The term "fringe credit industry" is used to describe creditors that provide
loans that the primary banking industry declines to make, either because of the loans'
small size or high risk. Characteristics of this industry are explored infra Part I.
4 See infra Part III.B.
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Part I briefly describes payday loans and refund anticipation
loans-two fringe credit products that have experienced explosive
growth in the last ten years.
Part II provides an in-depth look at the dangerous debt trap these
products create for individual debtors. It then examines the heavy
societal costs imposed by these loans, including higher bankruptcy
rates and increased demand for government welfare programs. Part
II concludes by demonstrating the minimal value these loans provide
in exchange for their high cost.
Part III explains how the fringe credit market differs significantly
from the idealized free market. Current disclosure requirements
under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) have failed to promote in-
formed shopping among borrowers, who get these disclosures too late
in the game and are unable to decipher their meaning. In addition,
emergency circumstances, privacy concerns, and compulsory tax laws
all contribute to noncompetitive rates in the fringe credit market.
Part IV explains the process by which the credit industry became
deregulated. The term "deregulation" is not meant to suggest that
the credit industry is entirely unregulated. Quite to the contrary, all
depository institutions (e.g., banks, credit unions, savings and loans)
are subject to the regulatory authority of at least one governmental
agency;5 usury statutes remain on the books of all fifty states;6 and
every lender is subject to TILA, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
the Federal Trade Commission Act (prohibiting "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce" 7), and several other fed-
eral regulations.8 The credit market is, however, deregulated in two
important respects. First, most of the above regulation is aimed at
disclosure and prohibiting fraudulent practices, leaving almost com-
plete control over interest rates and fees to the parties. Second, the
state laws that do attempt to regulate rates are largely preempted by
5 National banks are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), national credit unions by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA),
and federal savings and loan associations are regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion (OTS). See KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CmR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 75 (2d ed. 2000).
State banks are subject to inspection by state regulators. In addition, the ninety per-
cent of banks that are federally insured are subject to the regulation of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88
MINN. L. REV. 518, 542 (2004).
6 See KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, app. A (listing the statutory references for
the usury statutes of all fifty states).
7 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
8 See Schiltz, supra note 5, at 533.
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federal law that allows creditors to effectively choose the state whose
law will apply to them, regardless of where they do business. Part IV
focuses on why these preemptory federal statutes got enacted, how
their scope has expanded over time, and the accountability and notice
problems they now create.
The problems created by payday loans and refund anticipation
loans are significant in both scope and severity. Despite the harmful
nature of these products, a confluence of market imperfections and
improvident legal rules allows these products to thrive in the deregu-
lated credit market. Throughout this Note, numerous potential fixes
for these market and legal failures will be examined. Of these poten-
tial solutions, I propose that rate regulation is the most effective, effi-
cient, and fair solution to the problems created by fringe credit.
Accordingly, I urge the adoption of a floating interest rate ceiling set
at fifty percentage points above the one-month treasury rate-a rate
chosen to deter unconscionable and opportunistic loans while leaving
the mainstream credit market unregulated. Admittedly, adoption of
this rate ceiling would cause a restriction in credit availability and
would likely eliminate both payday loans and refund anticipation
loans. The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the elimina-
tion of these products is justified by both social policy and sound eco-
nomic principles.
I. THE GROWTH OF THE FRINGE CREDIT INDUSTRY
The term "fringe credit industry" describes creditors who provide
loans that the primary banking industry will not.9 Prior to the deregu-
lation of the credit industry, interest rate ceilings gave all lenders an
incentive to avoid making loans that were small, unsecured, or other-
wise high risk. The relatively high transaction costs and bad debt ex-
pense accompanying these loans made them unprofitable at legal
rates. After rate regulation was effectively eliminated, the fringe mar-
ket began to grow rapidly. The first creditors to take advantage of
9 Although this Note will focus exclusively on payday loans and refund anticipa-
tion loans, the fringe credit industry provides several other popular products, includ-
ing title loans (small loans, typically one month in duration, that are fully secured by
the debtor's car title), rent-to-own plans, and traditional pawn shop loans. See, e.g.,
Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Market-
place: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of
Usury Laws in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REv. 589, 597-600 (2000) (discussing pawn and
title loans); id. at 614-16 (discussing rent-to-own contracts).
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deregulation were national banks issuing credit cards.10 Then, in the
1990s, a new wave of fringe creditors emerged to plug the gaps left
behind by credit card companies. These "gaps" consisted of consum-
ers whose financial prospects were so dire that they failed to qualify
for credit cards, as well as card-carrying consumers who wanted one
more chance after maxing out their credit cards. Although the fringe
credit industry provides a number of products, this Note focuses on
two that illustrate the range of problems created by short-term, high-
rate credit: payday loans and refund anticipation loans.
A. Payday Loans
Payday loans are short-term loans that allow a consumer to bor-
row against his next payday check using a postdated personal check.
The typical payday loan is issued for a seven- to fourteen-day period
and carries a fee between fifteen dollars and thirty dollars per $100
borrowed.' A $300 loan will therefore normally cost between forty-
five dollars and ninety dollars if it is repaid within two weeks. 12 The
average loan fee-$18.28 per $100 borrowed-corresponds to an an-
nual percentage rate (APR) of 470%.13 Despite this high cost, payday
loans are immensely popular. Stores providing these loans first ap-
peared in the early 1990s. 14 By 2000, the number had grown to
12,000, and in 2002 it reached 15,000, a twenty-five percent increase
in two years. 15 During this same two-year period, fee revenue tripled
from $1.4 billion to $4.3 billion. 16
10 Nationwide credit card solicitations actually sparked the litigation that estab-
lished the Marquette exportation doctrine, which effectively ended rate regulation for
federal banks. See infra Part IV.A.
11 See JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND: PAYDAY
LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY 2 (2004), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdlrentabankreport.pdf.
12 The vast majority of customers actually extend their loans beyond the initial
two-week period. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
13 CONSUMER FED'N OF AM. & U.S. PUB. INTEREST RES. GROUP, RENT-A-BANK PAY-
DAY LENDING: HOW BANKS HELP PAYDAY LENDERS EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS
4 (2001) [hereinafter CFA/PIRG REPORT 2001], available at http://www.consumer
fed.org/paydayreport.pdf. The single most common fee, charged by thirty percent of
the 234 banks surveyed, was fifteen dollars per $100. Id. at 5.
14 See GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN
AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMER DEMAND 2 (Credit Research Ctr., Georgetown
Univ., Monograph No. 35, 2001), available at http://www.cfsa.net/mediares/Re-
ports/GeorgetownStudy.pdf.
15 See Fox, supra note 11, at 3-4.
16 Id.
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Prior to extending credit, payday lenders typically request that
applicants provide their last bank statement, their last pay stub, and
identification.1 7 Payday lenders do not obtain credit bureau reports,
although some use a special reporting service that tracks the con-
sumer's recent use of payday loans. 18 Customers supply a postdated
check in the amount of the loan plus the finance charge. Alterna-
tively, the lender may ask the customer to sign an agreement authoriz-
ing the lender to make an electronic withdrawal from his checking
account on the loan's due date. 19 The postdated check aids collection
and gives the lender leverage. As long as the borrower has sufficient
funds in his checking account on the loan due date, all the lender has
to do to collect the loan is deposit the check. The borrower has a
strong incentive to ensure sufficient funds are present or else to con-
tact the lender and pay a rollover (i.e., loan renewal) fee. Failure to
do either may result in bounced check fees from both the bank and
payday lender.
Thirty-three states have adopted legislation that specifically au-
thorizes payday lending, and two additional states permit these loans
via their general small loan laws. 20 Fifteen states currently have small
loan interest rate caps that attempt to prohibit payday lending.21 De-
spite these laws, payday lenders currently operate in every state thanks
to a federal law that allows banks to be governed by the state law of
their choosing and charter renting, a practice that allows nonbanks to
take advantage of this law through contractual partnerships with
banks.22 Nearly half of the thirty-three states that explicitly authorize
payday lending passed this legislation in the last five years.23 It is likely
that federal preemption and the inability of states to enforce their
own laws factored into these changes. The less stringent the law
17 See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 3.
18 Id.
19 See Fox, supra note 11, at 6.
20 Id. at 30 (listing the states and giving citations to the statutes that authorize
payday lending).
21 Id. at 29.
22 This preemptory scheme is explained in greater detail in Part V, infra.
23 See Fox, supra note 11, at 30 n.110 (listing the thirty-three states that explicitly
authorized payday lending as of March 2004 and citations for the authorizing stat-
utes). Two additional states allow payday lending through permissive small-loan laws
rather than specific legislation. Id. at 30. In contrast, a 1999 memo from a credit-
industry trade group listed only seventeen states that then had authorizing legislation.
See NAT'L CHECK CASHERS ASS'N, FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS: THE TRUTH
ABOUT DEFERRED DEPOSIT SERVICES-A REASONED RESPONSE TO THE CFA's MISREPRE-
SENTATIONS pt. III (1999), available at http://www.fisca.org/ddresponse.htm#
overview.
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adopted by a state, the less likely that lenders will circumvent it24 and
the more likely that the states will be able to keep track of the lenders
operating in their state.
Although the state schemes vary, a typical payday loan statute re-
quires lenders to be licensed and restricts loan duration, size, renewal
options, and fees. Loan size is typically limited to $500 or less, but five
states set their limit between $500 and $1000, and four allow any
amount.25 As will be explained in Part II.A., the design of most state
statutes that attempt to limit duration and loan renewals makes them
incredibly easy to circumvent. The rate limitations vary significantly in
structure (e.g., a schedule of fees, a flat fee per $100, or a flat fee plus
percent of loan value) 26 but are uniformly permissive. Ten states al-
low any rate to be charged, and even the most restrictive states allow
APRs of 390%.27 Although a limit of 390% is preferable to no limita-
tion at all, it is still extremely lenient-roughly comparable to telling a
rebellious child that they have a 5:00 a.m. curfew and may only eat a
pound of candy per day.
B. Refund Anticipation Loans
Refund anticipation loans (RALs) are short-term loans secured by
income tax refunds. The primary providers of RALs are national
banks that partner with commercial tax preparers. In exchange for a
fee from the bank, the tax preparers advertise the loans, transmit the
application to the bank, and disburse the funds to customers.2 8 Cli-
ents pay a flat fee based on the amount of the loan and may pay addi-
tional administrative, document preparation, or electronic filing
fees.29 The fees charged by RAL providers correspond to APRs rang-
ing from 70-700%.3o In exchange, customers receive a check equal to
the amount of their anticipated tax refund less loan fees, tax prepara-
24 Only depository institutions (i.e., banks, credit unions, etc.) have the right to
export state law. To take advantage of this privilege, nonbanks must enter into con-
tractual agreements with banks. By complying with state law, the nonbank lenders
avoid having to share their profits with a bank.
25 See Fox, supra note 11, at 31-33.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 See infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing Cades v. H & R Block,
Inc., 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1994), which involved an unsuccessful legal challenge to
this type of arrangement).
29 The loan fee that is tied to the loan amount goes to the bank that makes the
loan. The administrative fees go to the tax preparers that facilitate the loans.
Preparers may not legally tie these fees to the amount of the loan.
30 See CHI CHI Wu & JEAN ANN Fox, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CONSUMER
FED'N OF Am., ALL DRAIN, No GAIN: REFUND ANTICIPATION LOANS CONTINUE TO SAP
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tion fees, and filing fees. 3 1 This check is available in one to two days,
which is seven to ten days sooner than the funds would be available if
the taxpayer electronically filed and requested direct deposit without
taking out a loan.32 Many taxpayers that take out RALs do not realize
that they are taking out a loan rather than receiving an expedited
refund from the IRS.
3 3
The 2004 schedule of fees charged by Household Bank, the na-
tion's largest provider of RALs and H&R Block's RAL partner,3 4 is
presented below. Household's loan fees range from $29.95 to $69.95
and correspond to APRs ranging from 106% to 455%. The average
administrative fee charged by H&R Block is thirty-two dollars,35 which
pushes the total fee for a one-week $2000 loan to $102.
TABLE 1. 2004 RAL FEES FOR HOUSEHOLD BANK
APR (with
Loan Amount Loan Fee
3 6  APR 37  admininstrative fee)
3 8
$200-500 $29.95 182-455% 377-942%
$501-1000 $39.95 122-243% 219-437%
$1001-1500 $59.95 122-182% 186-279%
$1501-2000 $69.95 106-142% 155-207%
THE HARD-EARNED TAX DOLLARS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 2 (2004), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/RefundAnticipationLoanReport.pdf.
31 ALAN BERUBE ET AL., BROOKINGS INST. & PROGRESSIVE PoucY INST., THE PRICE
OF PAYING TAXES: How TAX PREPARATION AND REFUND LoAN FEES ERODE THE BENEFITS
OF THE EITC 4 (2002).
32 Id.
33 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
34 Wu & Fox, supra note 30, at 8-9. In 2002, Household processed seven million
RALs generating $240 million in income. Id.
35 Id. at 4-5. H&R Block has expressed its intention to phase out this fee over
several years. Id. at 5 n.14.
36 See id. at 9. The fees listed in Table 1 for loans above $500 are five to ten
dollars less than the fees charged by Santa Barbara Bank & Trust (SBBT), which is the
banking partner of Jackson Hewitt, the second-largest tax preparation chain in the
country. Id. at 9-10. SBBT imposes an additional surcharge of five dollars (for a ten
to fifteen dollar total difference) for customers whose refund includes funds from the
earned income tax credit. Id.
37 The APR ranges in the table were calculated according to the following
formula:
(loan fee / amount financed) x (365 / days in loan period) = APR.
To be conservative, a twelve-day loan period was assumed. If the taxpayer's refund
was received more quickly, the APR would increase.
38 These calculations include the thirty-two dollar average administrative fee in
the finance charge.
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RALs are widely popular. From 2000 to 2002, the number of
RALs increased eighteen percent from 10.8 million to 12.7 million. 39
Roughly one-tenth of all taxpayers,40 and one-third of those using a
professional tax preparer,41 obtained a RAL in 2002.
II. CAUSE FOR CONCERN: THE HARMFUL NATURE OF SHORT-TERM
HIGH-RATE LOANS
The previous section explained that the markets for both RALs
and payday loans are large, and that the latter is growing extremely
rapidly. Yet these products carry interest rates that are three to twenty
times higher than the interest rate cap that I propose. Am I seriously
suggesting that such popular products be eliminated in their entirety?
In short, the answer is yes. This section will examine the significant
harms that these products impose on both debtors and society as a
whole. Part III will then elaborate on the market conditions that
make these products popular in spite of themselves.
A. The Debt Trap
Although payday loans are advertised as a short-term solution,
they can quickly ensnare a debtor in long-term financial trouble. At
the average rate of $18.28 per $100 borrowed for a two-week period
(i.e., 475% APR), 42 it takes less than twelve weeks (or five rollovers)
for the amount of loan fees paid by a customer to exceed the amount
borrowed. 43 If a loan were allowed to continue at this rate for a full
year, the consumer would pay $4.75 in interest for every dollar bor-
rowed without getting any closer to paying off the loan.
39 Wu & Fox, supra note 30, at 9.
40 Id. at 3.
41 See CHI CHI Wu & JEAN ANN Fox, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CONSUMER
FED'N OF AM., THE HIGH COST OF QUICK TAX MONEY: TAX PREPARATION, 'INSTANT RE-
FUND' LOANS, AND CHECK CASHING FEES TARGET THE WORKING POOR 3 n.3 (2003),
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/2003-RAL-report.pdf.
42 CFA/PIRG REPORT 2001, supra note 13, at 4. The advertised rate of $18.28 per
$100 can be converted into an approximate APR by dividing 365 days by the length of
the loan period (i.e., fourteen days) to determine the number of loan periods in a
year, then multiplying this result by the advertised rate. For example, 365/14 = 26 x
18.28 = 475%. This calculation does not include compound interest because debtors
pay interest in the form of renewal fees at the end of each loan period.
43 To determine how long it will take for interest payments to exceed the face
amount of a loan, calculate:
1/i x 365 days
where i = the loan's interest rate expressed as a decimal (i.e., a twenty-five percent
APR is equivalent to 0.25). At a rate of 475% (i = 4.75), it would take seventy-seven
days for interest to exceed principal (365/4.75 = .2105 x 365 = 77).
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The credit industry is adamant that analyzing the fees for short-
term loans in terms of an APR and examining the long-term conse-
quences of borrowing at those rates is grossly inappropriate.
44 The
industry's largest trade association has likened APR disclosure to "a
pedestrian in New York City hailing a cab and asking about the fare to
San Francisco. '45 Creditors prefer to focus on the narrow circum-
stances in which borrowers find themselves in a bind, take out a loan
to avoid late fees, promptly repay the loan in two weeks, and come out
ahead financially. 46 Unfortunately, this scenario is rare in practice.
Empirical research shows that the vast majority of payday loan
customers extend their loans beyond the initial two-week period and
take out new loans frequently.47 In 2003, Iowa regulators reported
that nearly half of customers had twelve or more loans from the same
lender in 2003.48 A nationwide survey conducted by the Consumer
Research Center (CRC) found that three-fourths of customers nation-
wide had rolled over a loan at least once in the prior year and that
one-fourth had loans outstanding for more than half the year.
49 The
Coalition for Responsible Lending estimates that two-thirds of payday
loan customers receive five or more loans per year and that this cate-
gory of users generates ninety-one percent of the industry's fee reve-
nue. 50 More than half of revenue is attributable to customers with
44 See NAT'L CHECK CASHERS ASS'N, supra note 23, pt. V (referring to the use of
APRs to describe the payday loan industry as "virtually fraudulent"). The National
Check Cashers Association, which was subsequently renamed the Financial Service
Centers of America (FiSCA), represented approximately 3600 of the 6000 check cash-
ing locations in existence at the time of the report. Id. pt. I; see also Drysdale & Keest,
supra note 9, at 606 (discussing the benefits claimed by the fringe credit industry).
45 NAT'L CHECK CASHERS ASs'N, supra note 23, pt. V.
46 See id. pt. III.
47 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 605-09 (summarizing studies of payday
loan renewals and repeat business).
48 Fox, supra note 11, at 3.
49 See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 38-39. Throughout this note, I
will frequently refer to the results of the phone survey conducted by the CRC, a unit
of the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. This survey targeted
consumers that had recently purchased a payday loan from a member of the Commu-
nity Financial Services Association of America, an industry trade group that represents
approximately half of the payday lending offices in the country. Id. at 19. The fact
that the survey was conducted with industry cooperation, and that the CRC is often
associated with the credit industry, suggests that any bias in the structure or interpre-
tation of the survey would favor creditors.
50 KEITH ERNST ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, QUANTIFYING THE ECO-
NOMIC COST OF PREDATORY PAYDAY LENDING 5 (2004), available at http://www.respon-
siblelending.org/pdfs/CRLpaydaylendingstudyl21803.pdf. The Center's estimates
are consistent with the results of several state examiners. See id. at 5 tbl.1 (providing
statistics and citations for five states).
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thirteen loans or more.5 1 These statistics not only suggest the debt
trap is a real problem, but also cast doubt on the industry's ability to
survive without the business of trapped customers.
Although demand for payday loans is very high, a large portion of
this demand is attributable to hardships created by the loans them-
selves. One loan literally leads to another in a cycle of dependency
akin to drug addiction. A payday borrower has only two weeks to earn
sufficient funds to repay the loan principal and fees. Once he dedi-
cates a large portion of his paycheck to repayment of the first loan,
the borrower will likely find it difficult to stretch the remainder of the
paycheck until the next payday while continuing to pay regular ex-
penses. Whatever necessitated the first payday loan (e.g., car trouble,
a sick child, or marital difficulties) may continue to generate unplan-
ned expenses, making it more difficult for the borrower to scrape by
until the next payday. If the borrower loses this battle, he will likely
take out a new loan to bridge the gap. Unfortunately, the loan fees
associated with this new loan will jeopardize his ability to pay all of his
bills in the next period, perpetuating the cycle of dependency.
Even borrowers who appear to temporarily break free from the
debt cycle are vulnerable to relapse. During the period of indebted-
ness, a debtor who is trying to eliminate his payday loans as quickly as
possible must dedicate every dollar of expendable income towards in-
terest payment, leaving no money for maintenance expenses or sav-
ings. Many expenses-such as those for eye care, dental care,
medication, and routine home or car maintenance-can be delayed,
but not avoided entirely. Failure to maintain one's health and prop-
erty may lead to expensive repairs. Consumers who are caught in the
debt trap may also abandon insurance payments to get out, a gamble
that can have disastrous consequences.
State legislatures have attempted to protect consumers from this
debt trap by regulating loan renewals. Eighteen states prohibit a cus-
tomer from using the proceeds of a new payday loan to retire an ex-
isting one,5 2 and five limit the number of rollovers to three per loan.53
The goal of both prohibitions is easily circumvented, however, be-
cause consumers can take out a "new" loan minutes after they retire
the first one.54 Alternatively, customers may take out a loan from a
51 Id. at 5.
52 See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 6.
53 Id.
54 WOODSTOCK INST., REINVESTMENT ALERT No. 14, UNREGULATED PAYDAY LEND-
ING PULLS VULNERABLE CONSUMERS INTO SPIRALING DEBT 8 (2000), available at http://
woodstockinst.org/document/alert.pdf (noting that Illinois regulators find that the
state's three-rollover limit is regularly circumvented in this manner).
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second payday store to repay the loan owed to the first store-an op-
tion used by one-third of customers responding to a CRC study.
55
Even consumers who are not trying to circumvent rollover restrictions
will frequently have short gaps between loans because they repay their
loan on payday and then try, but fail, to make it two weeks on what
remains of their paycheck.
If states want to limit this debt trap more effectively without regu-
lating rates, they can limit the number of payday loans that an individ-
ual can receive from any lender during each three-month period,
treat each rollover as a separate loan, and create a mandatory report-
ing system to aid compliance and enforcement. This legislation would
reduce the amount of money a consumer can waste on payday loan
fees and reinforce the idea that the high rates legally permitted for
payday lenders are conditioned on their short-term nature.
However, this type of legislation has two drawbacks. First, the
costs of maintaining and enforcing the reporting system would either
be borne by the government or passed along to borrowers by credi-
tors. Second, if we assume that consumers would repay their payday
loans if they could, then decreasing the number of permitted loans or
rollovers will not prevent customers from defaulting, but rather will
speed the default process along. Debtors who are prohibited from
rolling over their loans may be worse off than if they had never taken
out a payday loan, because (1) they will be hit with bounced check
fees when the lender deposits their postdated check, (2) they still
must face the costs and stigma of default, and (3) the money they
spent on loan fees was wasted. For these reasons, legislators should
seriously consider placing more significant limitations on the rates
charged for payday loans (even if this reduces their availability) rather
than creating elaborate schemes to limit loan duration.
Each dollar a consumer dedicates to loan fees and interest pay-
ments is money that cannot be spent on current consumption, invest-
ment, or savings. When borrowers are trapped in payday loan debt,
the effect is a reduction in disposable income that reduces their fam-
ily's standard of living. Although all consumer debt can have this ef-
fect, payday loans are particularly damaging because the high loan
fees charged represent a substantial fraction of the borrower's
paycheck and borrowers are often deeply indebted prior to taking out
the loan. 56 Living on the brink of insolvency causes many consumers
to experience shame, guilt, and high levels of stress, which may nega-
55 See ELLIEA USEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 40.
56 Half of all payday loan customers and one-fourth of the adult population have
consumer debt burdens that require more than ten percent of their monthly income.
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tively affect their mental and physical health, job performance, and
family life.
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B. Beyond the Consumer: Damage to Society Stemming from the Debt Trap
The previous section illustrated the devastating effect that the
debt trap can have on individual debtors. The costs of the debt trap,
however, are not borne entirely by the debtor, but also spill over to
society. The deregulation of the credit market led to a significant in-
crease in credit availability and aggregate consumer debt. Further-
more, the increased availability of fringe credit has allowed consumers
to become highly leveraged, meaning that their debt loads are high in
comparison to their assets and earning potential. Unfortunately, the
high debt levels and high interest rates that exist in a deregulated
credit market tend to (1) adversely affect creditors and consumers in
the mainstream credit market, (2) decrease savings rates, (3) increase
bankruptcy rates, and (4) increase the cost of government welfare
programs.
First, the availability of high-rate fringe credit (e.g., payday loans)
has a detrimental effect on creditors and consumers that do not use
these products. 58 An economically rational customer will devote his
disposable income to paying off debt with high interest rates before
that with low rates unless the creditors supplying the latter have more
leverage (e.g., the ability to eject the borrower from his home, turn off
his utilities, or repossess his car). Unfortunately, this means that the
fringe creditors responsible for overextending credit may be the first
to get paid out of each new paycheck, leaving creditors that charge
relatively low rates holding the bag if the debtor becomes insolvent.
Because creditors treat the write-off of bad debts as an expense, this
cost is passed on to all customers in the form of higher prices.
Second, the widespread availability of emergency credit discour-
ages savings. Between 1999 and 2003, Americans saved an average of
only two percent of their disposable personal income as compared to
9.8% for the period between 1970 and 1984.59 Personal savings rates
have been decreasing steadily since 1984, regardless of the financial
Nearly one-fifth of payday loan customers have payment-to-income ratios above thirty
percent. Id. at 45.
57 See George J. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE LJ. 461, 472
(1973) (describing psychological consequences of defaulting on debt).
58 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 664.
59 Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, The National Income and
Product Accounts of the United States, tbl.2.1, at http://bea.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/
SelectTable.asp?Selected=N#S5 (last revised Feb. 25, 2005) (listing the average annual
personal savings rates for each year since 1929). The two percent figure is an average
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state of the economy, and hit a sixty-six-year low of one percent in
2004.60 Meanwhile, the level of outstanding consumer debt in
America has grown to $9.7 trillion, which is more than double the
level of debt carried ten years earlier and is not far behind the U.S.
gross domestic product of $11.6 trillion.
61
Third, low savings rates coupled with high debt loads have played
a significant role in the growing number of bankruptcies in this coun-
try. In 2003, more than 1.625 million Americans filed for bankruptcy,
a seven-fold increase from the 259,160 that filed in 1980.62 This
growth in bankruptcies is highly correlated to growth in consumer
debt levels. 63 The greater an individual's debt-to-income ratio, the
more dependent he becomes on steady income. Where a consumer
has both small amounts of disposable income each month and low
levels of savings, he has no buffer to protect himself from unexpected
expenses or temporary income loss. A number of adverse events
could push him into default. The consumer's high debt load would
then make it difficult to recover as new bills continued to roll in. If
the debtor resorts to bankruptcy or if lenders use the court systems to
collect debt, society must pick up part of the tab in the form of salaries
for the judges, administrators, enforcement officials, and clerical em-
ployees that run the courts.
64
of the following annual rates: 2.4% (1999), 2.3% (2000), 1.8% (2001), 2.0% (2002),
and 1.4% (2003).
60 The personal savings rate as a percentage of disposable income was 10.8% in
1984 and one percent in 2004. Id.
61 Agnes T. Crane, Consumers Play Key Role in Rates, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2004, at
C5. This debt figure includes mortgage debt as well as consumer credit. Id.
62 Analytical Servs. Office, Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures,
tbl.5.2, at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table5.0
2 .pdf (last modified
Mar. 2003).
63 See PAUL C. BISHOP, A TIME SERIES MODEL OF THE U.S. PERSONAL BANKRUPTCYv
RATE (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Bank Trends No. 98-01, 1998), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/bt
9 801.pdf; DIANE ELLIS, THE EFFECT OF CON-
SUMER INTEREST RATE DEREGULATION ON CREDIT CARD VOLUMES, CHARGE-OFFS, AND
THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY RATE 6-10 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Bank Trends No. 98-
05, 1998) (discussing the relationship between rate deregulation, credit availability,
and bankruptcy rates), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/bank/
bt_9805.pdf; Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1080-83
(1998) (summarizing numerous studies that have found a high correlation between
consumer debt and bankruptcy and explaining that "consumers' bankruptcies are ris-
ing because consumer debts are rising faster than their incomes").
64 See, e.g., KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, at 63 (noting that restricting high-risk
credit benefits "traditional lenders or investors who are harmed by the consumer
bankruptcies caused by predatory lending"); Wallace, supra note 57, at 471.
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Fourth, even where payday loan customers avoid defaulting on
their loans, as most do, society may end up paying for items for which
they failed to save. For instance, if individuals do not save money for
retirement, this increases their reliance on Social Security. If they do
not save for their children's education, there will be greater reliance
on loans, scholarships, and government subsidies to send the next
generation to college. If borrowers do not invest money in health in-
surance, hospitals will end up subsidizing their care and spreading the
costs to others.
These societal costs provide a compelling justification for limiting
the aggregate level of consumer debt in our society. Adoption of a
floating interest rate ceiling would reduce credit availability and pro-
vide the dual benefits of protecting consumers from the debt trap and
protecting society from the costs and destabilizing effects of high con-
sumer debt loads.
C. The Welfare Drain Caused by Refund Anticipation Loans
Refund anticipation loans, like payday loans, impose significant
costs on society. Although RALs do not present the danger that cus-
tomers will become ensnared in a debt trap (because they are availa-
ble only once a year), they have a significant, direct effect on the cost
and effectiveness of government welfare programs.
The United States government uses tax refunds as an important
vehicle for certain welfare payments. Although few people think of
the tax system as providing welfare, the Internal Revenue Code is rid-
dled with deductions and credits intended to promote social policies
rather than accurately measure income.65 Tax deductions based on
social policies are named "tax expenditures" to reflect the fact that the
government's choice to enact a new deduction or credit for specific
taxpayers has a similar effect as other government expenditures-the
government must either collect more in taxes from taxpayers as a
whole, cut back on other government programs, or else allow the
budget deficit to increase.66 Because tax expenditures are prevalent,
all Americans have a stake in ensuring that refunds reach taxpayers
largely intact. If creditors capture $100 of a tax refund by convincing
taxpayers to purchase a RAL, this undermines the goals behind the
credit or deduction that led to the refund and forces the general tax-
payer population to fund the profits of RAL providers.
65 ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 165-66 (5th ed. 2002).
66 Id. at 165.
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The case of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) illustrates how
RALs drain government funds from their intended beneficiaries. Ap-
proximately forty percent of RAL customers are recipients of the
EITC,67 a refundable credit designed to raise children and their par-
ents out of poverty while rewarding work rather than dependence on
welfare. 68 Because the credit is refundable, taxpayers can receive the
full amount even if their tax liability has already been reduced to zero.
In tax year 2000, the program distributed nearly thirty-one billion dol-
lars to low-income workers, which is roughly equivalent to the amount
spent on food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
combined. 69 The average EITC recipient received a credit of $1700 in
2002,70 which would cost approximately seventy-five dollars in loan
fees to receive as a RAL.71 It is estimated that approximately $363
million was drained out of the EITC program in 2002 by RAL loan
fees alone, not counting e-filing or administrative fees.
72
D. A Lack of Socially Redeeming Value
The previous three sections have outlined the harm caused by
short-term, high-rate credit. This section considers the value provided
by this credit, and demonstrates that despite the immense popularity
of these loans they provide minimal economic value to debtors. Be-
cause payday loans last only two weeks and RALs only one week, con-
sumers cannot rationally use these loans for investment purposes.
73
Their role is limited to the avoidance of other costs, such as late pay-
ment fees, bounced check fees (charged by both the bank and
merchant), damage to the consumer's credit history from default
(which may increase the cost of credit in the future), and the opportu-
67 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR. & CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., TAX PREPARERS PEDDLE
HIGH PRICED TAX REFUND LOANS: MILLIONS FROM THE WORKING POOR AND THE 
U.S.
TREASURY 5-6 (2002) [hereinafter CFA REPORT 2002].
68 ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., REWARDING WoRK THROUGH THE TAX CODE:
THE POWER AND POTENTIAL OF THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT IN 27 CITIES AND Ru-
RAL AREAs 2 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.org/dybdocroot/es/urban/
publications/berubetaxcode.pdf.
69 Id. at 1-2.
70 Id. at 2.
71 See supra Table 1.
72 BERUBE, supra note 68, at 2.
73 Using loans to finance investments is only rational if the expected return on
investment exceeds the cost of funds (i.e., interest rate), which averages 470% APR
for payday loans. The presence of such a stellar investment is highly doubtful. The
average rate of return in the stock market between 1950 and 1992 was only 12.3%. See
Lynn Asinof, Double-Digit Returns May Be Tougher to Find, WALL ST. J.,July 27, 1992, at
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nity cost of missing work due to a broken vehicle. Expenses such as
these that can be avoided by taking out a loan occasionally exceed the
fees for a two-week loan, making payday loans seem like a rational
choice. The value provided by these loans is actually very low, how-
ever, for three reasons.
First, a payday loan only seems economically rational when evalu-
ated using an incredibly narrow time frame, which ignores the irra-
tional consumer behavior or economic factors that led to the credit
emergency in the first place. If a consumer does not write an insuffi-
cient funds check, he will not face bounced check fees, even if he is
unable to pay his bills. The decision not to save any money or keep an
available credit line in case of emergencies is itself an unwise choice.
If the option of a payday loan were eliminated, consumers could ad-
just their behavior so that the option immediately before payday loans
(e.g., maxing out their credit cards or asking family members for
loans) would become their new "option of last resort." Admittedly,
building up a rainy day fund or asking friends for money may not be
realistic options for the poorest consumers. Yet any consumer that
finds it impossible to save money due to economic and social factors
will find it equally impossible to pay back a payday loan with interest.
Second, the economic rationality of payday loans typically relies
on them being paid off within two weeks. A consumer who overesti-
mates his ability to repay on time has effectively traded in debt that
came due once a month (the typical billing cycle for credit cards and
utilities) for debt that comes due twice as often and charges rates
twenty-times higher. If the debtor defaults on the payday loan, he will
likely be hit with bounced check fees when the lender sends the bor-
rower's check through the payment system at the end of the loan pe-
riod, making these loans even riskier.
Third, a consumer that does not have other credit options in the
short term may still have other options. Most consumers are less than
two weeks from their next payday when they take out a loan (this is
certainly true if they get paid every two weeks), so that they only need
to delay expenses for a few days. In the case of a car repair, the con-
sumer could take public transit or ask for a ride from friends. A con-
sumer faced with multiple bills can choose not to pay the ones that
have low late payment fees or default consequences until his next pay-
day. Calling creditors to work out a payment plan or asking friends or
community groups for help may also be an option. These options will
be limited if the debtor has already used the above tactics in past
months and is now overdue on most bills. However, such behavior
itself calls into question the ability of the consumer to pay off a short-
term loan without getting trapped. If the consumer were capable of
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straightening out his finances in two weeks, why would he have not
already done so?
The value of RALs is even more limited. Even though RALs can
be just as expensive as payday loans, they are used by one-third of all
taxpayers having their returns professionally prepared. It is doubtful
that each of these taxpayers would have sought out a payday loan if his
last W-2 or Form 1099 had not happened to arrive in the mail that
week.7 4 Even if they had, it is unlikely the loan sought would have
been as large as the taxpayer's refund. The fact that such a large num-
ber of taxpayers take out loans at last-resort triple-digit rates, when
they are not actually faced with an emergency, strongly suggests these
consumers do not understand a RAL's true cost.
RALs ostensibly provide two benefits to taxpayers. First, they al-
low taxpayers to receive their refund one week early. This benefit is
overshadowed by the high cost of the loan and the fact that the tax-
payer has already been waiting a year to receive his refund. Second,
RALs eliminate the need for taxpayers to save money for preparation
fees prior to filing. Even without taking out a RAL, however, taxpay-
ers need not save. They need only be capable of parting with $100 for
one week. A taxpayer who is broke can wait until his next payday to
pay preparation fees and have his refund back in time to pay end-of-
period expenses. Alternatively, low-income taxpayers can take advan-
tage of Free File 75 or the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program
(VITA) ,76 both of which provide free tax preparation.
The prior paragraph focused on the benefits of RALs to the bor-
rower. However, RALs also provide benefits to professional tax
preparers such as attracting customers and guaranteeing prompt pay-
ment for services. The fact that preparers benefit from RALs makes
the loan administrative fees they charge borrowers and the helper's
74 A taxpayer cannot file a return until he receives a W-2, which summarizes earn-
ings and withholdings, from each employer who he worked for during the prior year.
If the taxpayer earned interest or dividends or received governmental payments such
as social security, he must also wait for Form 1099s from each of the sources of this
income. These tax documents (i.e., W-2s and 1099s) must be attached to the tax-
payer's return at the time of filing.
75 Free File is a program sponsored through the IRS website that provides free
online tax preparation and e-filing for up to sixty percent of taxpayers. See Internal
Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Free File Help Center & Frequently Asked Questions:
Who Is Eligible for Free File?, at http://www.irs.gov/efile/article/0,,id=l 18993,00.html#
basics_3 (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
76 VITA is a program in which local volunteers provide free tax advice to individu-
als with incomes below $36,000. See Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury,
VITA and TCE, at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=19845,00.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2005).
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fee they receive from the lender (which gets built into the loan fee
charged to borrowers) seem even more unreasonable. 77 It also sug-
gests that a usury law that limited RAL fees to rates below what is cur-
rently charged would not necessarily have a substantial impact on loan
availability. Preparers may be willing to waive a portion of the fees
they currently receive in order to preserve the other benefits they re-
ceive from RALs.
In summary, the benefits provided to consumers by payday loans
and RALs are minimal, while the cost and risk of such loans is high.
At first glance, this conclusion appears to contradict fundamental
principles of market theory. If these loans fail to provide value be-
yond their cost, why are they so popular? One explanation is that
these loans create negative externalities-costs borne by society rather
than the parties who choose how much credit to supply and demand.
Further explanations are explored in the next Part, which details the
ways in which the fringe credit market differs from the idealized free
market.
III. WHY THE PAYDAY LOAN MARKET DiFFERs SIGNIFICANTLY FROM
THE IDEALIZED FREE MARKET
A. Vulnerable Clientele
1. The Role of Duress and Secrecy in Driving Up Prices
Consumers in the fringe credit market are united by a common
trait-they desperately need or want cash and believe they have no
suitable alternatives. Currently, the average payday loan carries an in-
terest rate thirty times higher than the average credit card rate. 78 The
rates for RALs are five to fifty times higher than those charged for
credit cards. 79 Individuals who are willing to pay such a high pre-
mium for fringe credit either (1) do not fully understand the cost and
risk of this credit as it compares to their alternatives or (2) do not
77 See infra Part III.C.2 for an explanation of why the fees charged for RALs are
not justified by risk or transaction costs.
78 See Ruth Simon & Jennifer Saranow, Credit Cards Start to Bump Up Rates, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 6, 2004, at D2 (reporting that the average rate charged for credit cards
with variable rates at the end of 2003 was 13.86%). In contrast, the average payday
loan fee corresponds to a rate of 470%. See CFA/PIRG REPORT 2001, supra note 13, at
4.
79 See Wu & Fox, supra note 30, at 2 (reporting that RAL fees correspond to APRs
between seventy percent and 700%); Simon & Saranow, supra note 78 (reporting an
average credit card rate of 13.86%).
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have any alternatives. The majority of fringe credit customers appear
to fall into the first category,80 but the latter is worth examining.
One of the primary ways that fringe creditors compete success-
fully with the mainstream credit market is by exhibiting greater risk
tolerance than other lenders. Payday lenders advertise that ajob and
a checking account are all that is needed to obtain same-day cash,
which attracts customers who have bad credit histories or few assets to
offer as collateral. However, it also attracts consumers who actively
participate in the mainstream market l but who turn to payday loans
when unexpected expenses arise after they have exhausted their sav-
ings and credit card limits. 82 Because these customers have nowhere
else to turn, they are extremely vulnerable to price gouging.
Opportunities for price gouging are accentuated by payday bor-
rowers' common desire for privacy. Consumers may be embarrassed
by their financial problems, especially if these problems stem from
unwise investments or purchases. The unexpected expenses that the
consumer faces may be attributable to an addiction, marital difficulty,
or other underlying problem that the individual wants to keep confi-
dential. Consumers are willing to pay a substantial premium to avoid
asking friends or family members for a loan or going to a government
or charitable agency for help. Individuals may also be reluctant to cut
expenditures that would signal to their friends or colleagues that they
are in financial trouble, which further fuels demand for payday loans.
Although consumers obviously value the confidentiality offered
by payday loans, this attribute of the market presents three problems.
First, it suppresses the exchange of information regarding prices,
creditor reputations, and alternatives to the fringe market. Potential
borrowers concerned about privacy are unlikely to ask their friends
for advice on where to get a good price on emergency credit. Further-
more, borrowers cannot share complaints about a creditor without ad-
mitting they took out a loan. A consumer who was already
embarrassed about his financial problems may become even more so
if he feels he "should have known better" than to agree to bad loan
80 See infra Part III.1.2.
81 Ninety-two percent of payday loan customers had at least one consumer loan
outstanding (e.g., a home mortgage, auto loan, product payment plan, or credit card)
at the time they took out their payday loan. See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note
14, at 42.
82 Although fifty-seven percent of payday loan customers surveyed by the CRC
had bank credit cards, only six percent considered using them as an alternative to a
payday loan, which suggests that these consumers either did not understand the rate
difference between these options or had no open credit remaining on their credit
cards. See id. at 42, 50.
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terms. Borrowers may be more comfortable discussing credit issues if
their friends and family regularly use fringe credit. Unfortunately,
this creates a problem of its own: if none of the borrower's acquaint-
ances are financially savvy, he may never have been exposed to good
credit terms, making it difficult to recognize bad ones.83
Second, creditors can discourage comparison shopping by struc-
turing the loan process in a manner that capitalizes on customers'
desire for privacy. Many payday lenders phone the bosses or human
resource managers of first-time applicants to verify employment.84
Often this verification occurs before debtors are shown TILA disclo-
sures for a loan.8 5 Debtors have a strong incentive not to shop be-
tween lenders because they want to avoid the embarrassment and
potential job instability that could result from their boss receiving
multiple phone calls in a short time period.86
Third, hiding problems does not make them go away. Many of
the underlying problems that lead debtors to resort to payday loans
are not one-time events that can be resolved in two weeks. The money
that an individual devotes to hiding his problems (i.e., payday loan
fees) is money that is not available for solving them. If a debtor can-
not afford to continue paying rollover fees or bumps up against statu-
tory renewal limits, he will be forced into default and will have to ask
for the help he had been avoiding. If default occurs in the first twelve
weeks, the payday lender will suffer a loss on the account. However, if
the debtor continues to make payments for at least twelve weeks
before defaulting, the payday lender will break even and any addi-
tional profits he makes will come at the expense of the entity that
eventually bails the debtor out.
2. The Role of Rate Regulation in Protecting Consumers from
Unconscionable Bargains
The prior section demonstrated that consumers in the fringe
credit industry are vulnerable to price gouging and unconscionable
creditor conduct. Rate regulation plays a valuable and necessary role
in deterring such conduct. Although much of this Note focuses on
83 See Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding and High-Cost Consumer
Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV. 807, 897 (2003)
("[A] II reliable shopping information must at some point be obtained on a first hand
basis. If virtually no one in a family or neighborhood has access to reliable and effec-
tive shopping information, then there is no basis for an effective informal word of
mouth shopping process to begin.").
84 Id. at 895.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 896.
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averages, these averages pale in comparison to the highest payday
loan fees charged in practice. For instance, the highest rate charged
in Missouri for the one-year period ending September 30, 2004, was
1278%.87 While there are limits to what customers will agree to and to
what they will actually pay before defaulting, those limits are much
higher than one may initially expect. One out of ten customers sur-
veyed by the CRC had continuously rolled over a loan for at least four-
teen weeks, which means they paid more in interest than they
received from the loan. A number of customers have paid triple the
amount of their original loan and still had property seized by preda-
tory lenders after they default.
88
Although the unconscionability and fraud doctrines should theo-
retically prevent egregious loans, there are two benefits to using rate
regulation as a substitute or supplement to these doctrines. First, fed-
eral rate regulation could reduce litigation costs by providing a bright
line rule of what rates are acceptable. 89 As long as the rule remains
"whatever the parties agree to," there are bound to be loans that
shock the conscience and motivate consumer advocates to litigate.
Rate regulation would reduce the need for such protective litigation
and make it easier to dispose of cases once they arise.
Second, rate regulation is warranted because the fraud and un-
conscionability doctrines provide little actual protection. These doc-
trines place the cost and burden of enforcement on the very people
that are least able to afford litigation or understand their legal rights.
Consumer loans involve such small amounts that bringing these cases
on an individual basis is cost prohibitive. Even if attorneys were will-
ing to work for free, the damage award for an individual case would
have minimal deterrent effect. Therefore, enforcement depends en-
tirely on government regulators and class actions.
Unfortunately, the ability of class actions to deter unconscionable
and fraudulent conduct is declining due to the increased use of
mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit class treatment.90 The
Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce arbitration clauses
87 Letter from D. Eric McClure, Commissioner of Finance, State of Missouri, to
Matt Blunt, Governor, State of Missouri 2 (Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://
www.missouri-finance.org/pdfs/survey.pdf.
88 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 606-07 (summarizing six egregious cases
that made headlines).
89 See KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, at 64.
90 See Marjorie Wengert, Annotation, Cause of Action Against Payday Loan Creditors
for Violating Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 26 CAUSES OF Ac-
TION 2D 409, § 36, at 473 (2004).
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according to their terms,9 1 even if the clause is part of an adhesion
contract, unless they find the arbitration clause itself void "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract"9 2 (e.g., fraudulent inducement or unconscionability). If the ar-
bitration clause itself is not found to be unconscionable, a consumer's
claim that other provisions of the contract are unconscionable must
be decided in accordance with the procedures set forth in the arbitra-
tion agreement (e.g., no class arbitration). 93 Where an arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue of class arbitration, the arbitrator is
responsible for determining what the parties intended.9 4 Statutory
claims are not exempt from arbitration unless the plaintiff can show
that Congress intended to create an unwaivable right to a judicial fo-
rum9 5 or that the terms of the arbitration clause would prevent the
plaintiff from vindicating her statutory rights. 9 6 The majority of
courts have held that Congress did not intend to grant consumers an
unwaivable right to bring TILA claims as a class and that collective
action is not necessary for a consumer to vindicate her rights. 9 7 The
Ninth Circuit stands alone in its willingness to invalidate clauses that
91 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) ("A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may peti-
tion . .. for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
for in such agreement." (emphasis added)).
92 Id. § 2.
93 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Hood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 406 (1967).
94 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion).
95 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) ("Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue.").
96 See id. ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000) (finding that large arbitration costs could preclude a liti-
gant from vindicating her statutory rights, but requiring proof that such costs were
likely to be incurred).
97 See Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814, 818 (lth Cir. 2001)
(holding that arbitration is not "'inherently inconsistent' with the TILA enforcement
scheme"); Bowen v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 233 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "the legislative history of § 1640 shows that Congress thought class ac-
tions were a significant means of achieving compliance with the TILA" but holding
that Congress did not intend to "confer upon individuals a non-waivable right to pur-
sue a class action"); Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 370-78 (3d Cir.
2000) (same).
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ban class arbitration in consumer contracts on the basis of
unconscionability.9 8
Even if not barred by the loan contract, class actions are often
inappropriate because of the fact-specific nature of unconscionability
and fraud claims. The presence of substantive unconscionability in
the form of outrageous rates is not sufficient for recovery.99 Plaintiffs
must also prove procedural unconscionability, such as a disparity in
education levels coupled with deceptive or heavy-handed sales tactics.
Unless these unconscionable procedures were uniformly applied to
customers, borrowers will have difficulty obtaining class certification.
B. Imperfect Information in the Fringe Market: Why TILA Disclosure Does
Not Work
Economic models of the free market assume that consumers have
knowledge of the alternatives available to them as well as the full costs
and benefits of these alternatives, allowing them to choose the option
that they believe maximizes their self-interest.100 But the reality of the
fringe credit market contrasts sharply with this assumption. Congress
attempted to improve consumer access to accurate information in
1968 when it passed TILA. 10 1 Twelve years later it tried again, substan-
tially revising TILA in response to the widespread belief that the first
version caused information overload and was ineffective. 10 2 Unfortu-
nately, current disclosure requirements remain ineffective for two
98 See Wengert, supra note 90, § 39 (describing California's approach to class arbi-
tration); see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an arbi-
tration clause that prohibited class arbitration unconscionable, reasoning that the
clause was one sided despite its technical applicability to both parties because AT&T
would never have reason to sue its customers as a class). The Ting court also struck
down a confidentiality clause because it unfairly favored the "repeat player" and pre-
vented consumers from building a case of intentional misconduct. Id. at 1151-52.
99 See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th
Cir. 2004) (noting that "a provision must possess features of both adhesionary forma-
tion and unduly harsh substance" in order to be invalidated for unconscionability).
100 See Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP.
L. REv. 151, 156 (1988) (explaining that free market theorists believe that the bar-
gaining dialogue between lenders and borrowers will lead to "the price and amount
of credit that is in the individuals' and society's best interests," but criticizing this
theory because it "presumes equal aptitude, intelligence, information, and vigor on
the parts of both borrower and lender").
101 Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2000)); see Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(2004).
102 Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act (Depository Institutions Der-
egulation & Monetary Control Act of 1980), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168 (1980)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1646 (2000)).
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main reasons. First, information is not made available sufficiently
early to be useful. Second, disclosure is made in terms that the major-
ity of consumers do not understand. In particular, the APR-the cen-
terpiece of TILA disclosures-is ignored or misunderstood by the
majority of consumers.
1. Too Little, Too Late
The disclosures required by TILA come too late in the process to
facilitate comparison shopping. In the absence of customer inquiry,
TILA does not require any disclosure until immediately before the
loan document is signed. By that time, a consumer looking for a pay-
day loan will have invested time and money in getting to the store,
visiting with a clerk, and filling out an application. The transportation
and opportunity costs of repeating this process for multiple stores
would likely exceed the fees saved by comparison shopping. Even if a
consumer wished to continue shopping after seeing the first disclo-
sure, he may not have time to do so. Payday loans are designed for
emergency expenses that the borrower believes cannot wait for the
next payday, and the consumer likely spends the bulk of his day at
work.
The anticompetitive effect of delayed disclosure is more pro-
nounced in the market for RALs. Traditionally, RALs were advertised
as "rapid refunds" or "money now," not as loans. Providers are now
legally required to describe these products as loans in their advertise-
ments,103 but it is unclear whether this message reaches consumers. 104
Because lenders are not required to give any indication of a RAL's
cost in advertisements, customers typically remain unaware of the
amount (or even the existence) of loan fees until after their tax re-
turns are substantially completed. If a customer dislikes what he sees
in the disclosures, he can choose not to apply for the RAL. However,
he cannot file the return or take it to a competing RAL provider for a
cost comparison until after he pays the tax preparation fees that were
incurred prior to disclosure. Unfortunately, a major reason that cus-
tomers take out RALs in the first place is that they have not saved
103 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. No. 1345, HAND-
BOOK FOR AUTHORIZED IRS E-FILE PROVIDERS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS
74-75 (2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub1345.pdf.
104 A 1996 study found that half of taxpayers did not know that they had taken out
a loan even after they had signed the documents. See CFA REPORT 2002, supra note
67, at 22. This study was conducted before RAL providers began advertising RALs as
loans. The current state of consumer awareness is unknown.
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money to pay these fees in advance and wish to have them deducted
from their refund (i.e., rolled into the loan).
An additional obstacle to comparison shopping is that RAL prov-
iders generally require borrowers to e-file and to instruct the IRS to
deposit their refund directly with the lender as repayment. Preparers
typically waive e-filing fees for returns they prepare. However, a cus-
tomer who walks away with his return in paper format in search of
better RAL terms would likely have to pay this e-filing fee to any com-
peting RAL provider. This additional e-filing fee likely counteracts
any savings in RAL fees, making the attempt to compare TILA disclo-
sures unprofitable.
2. "Meaningful Disclosure" in a Financially Illiterate Nation
The second major problem with disclosure as a substitute for rate
regulation and other consumer protections is that it assumes that con-
sumers will understand the disclosure they are given. In this respect,
the required disclosures for financial products differ significantly
from those required for tangible products. Manufacturers and distrib-
utors of tangible products are held strictly liable for failure to warn
consumers of dangers presented by a product that are not obvious to
the average consumer.10 5 Even dangers from misuse of products must
be disclosed if the misuse is foreseeable.
0 6 Most importantly, manu-
facturers must design warnings so that they will reach and be under-
stood by the consumer. In contrast, the products marketed by
creditors need only make those disclosures specifically required by
TILA, which fail to take into account the level of financial sophistica-
tion of the typical borrower.
The two most important price disclosures required by TILA are
the finance charge and the APR. 10 7 The finance charge is "the sum of
all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom the
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor
105 See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Cause of Action in Strict Tort Liability for
Failure to Warn of Danger in Use of Product, 29 CAUSES OF ACTION § 6, at 20-21 (2004).
Courts generally apply one of three tests to determine if a defendant had a duty to
warn consumers of a specific danger. A duty to warn may arise where (1) a product is
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer of the product possessing the knowledge common to the community of
such consumers," (2) the danger presented by the product was not "open and obvi-
ous," or (3) the product is unreasonably dangerous in light of all relevant factors,
including the obviousness of the danger. Id. The first test is derived from RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) cmt. i (1965).
106 See Miller, supra note 105, § 7, at 32.
107 Peterson, supra note 83, at 880.
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as an incident to the extension of credit."108 The finance charge in-
cludes interest and most of the fees necessary to obtaining the loan,
but does not include avoidable fees such as those for late payment. 109
The APR is "a measure of the cost of credit, expressed as a yearly
rate, that relates the amount and timing of [money] received by the
consumer to the amount and timing of payments made."' 10 In many
respects, the APR is the centerpiece of TILA disclosures. TILA specifi-
cally requires that when advertising the rate of a finance charge' or
"responding orally to any inquiry about the cost of credit, a creditor,
regardless of the method used to compute finance charges, shall state
rates only in terms of the annual percentage rate."112 Similarly, no
advertisement may state the dollar amount of a finance charge with-
out including the APR and the terms of repayment. 13
Despite the prominent role of the APR in TILA disclosures, most
consumers do not understand the significance of this credit term or
even take note of it. A nationwide study sponsored by the Consumer
Federation of America found that thirty percent of Americans did not
know what the letters APR stand for, and sixty-three percent did not
realize that this rate was the primary indicator of a loan's cost.114 An
earlier study targeted at college students found that seventy-eight per-
cent of college juniors and seniors did not understand how to use the
APR to make price comparisons. 1 5 A CRC survey of payday loan cus-
tomers confirms that borrowers often ignore or misunderstand APR
disclosures. The study found that although seventy-eight percent of
customers remembered being told an APR, only twenty percent were
willing to venture a guess as to what it was. 1" 6 Of the customers pro-
viding an answer, forty-one percent believed they had paid a rate be-
low thirty percent APR. 117 This suggests that consumers confuse the
108 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2000).
109 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(1) (2004) (listing fees that need not be included in
the finance charge, including "[a]pplication fees charged to all applicants for credit,
whether or not credit is actually extended").
110 Id. § 226.22(a)(1).
111 15 U.S.C. § 1664(c).
112 Id. § 16 65a. In limited circumstances (inapplicable to payday loans and RALs),
TILA allows disclosure of a "periodic rate" or "simple annual rate" in addition to the
APR. Id.
113 Id. § 1664(d).
114 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 662 n.441.
115 Kiddie Credit Cards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Ins. of the
House Comm. on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 40 (1994) (statement of
Ruth Susswein, Executive Dir., Bankcard Holders of Am.).
116 ELLIE-AUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 49.
117 Id.
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APR and the add-on rates (e.g., fifteen dollars per $100 for two
weeks) 1 8 and may explain why consumers do not balk at the idea of
paying rates twenty times higher than their credit cards. The consum-
ers may wrongly believe that payday loans are only ten percentage
points higher than credit card rates.
In contrast to the minimal awareness of APRs, ninety-six percent
of customers surveyed by the CRC could recall the finance charge they
paid.'1 9 The finance charge is more memorable because it resembles
the price tags the consumer is accustomed to seeing. Consumers
know how to compare a forty-five-dollar loan fee against a thirty-dollar
late fee. They are less likely to know how to use a loan's APR to make
comparisons. How much more expensive is it to borrow $300 for two
weeks at a 500% APR instead of a twenty-five percent APR? The an-
swer is approximately fifty-five dollars, 120 but it is an answer that the
average consumer cannot calculate. The credit industry's attitude to-
wards APR disclosure also makes it likely that the importance of the
APR is downplayed in discussions between lenders and customers.
If consumers are aware of the finance charge, then why does it
matter that they do not understand APR disclosure? The APR per-
forms two vital roles that the finance charge, standing alone, cannot.
First, it facilitates price comparisons. Second, it provides information
on the cost of the loan if it does extend beyond the initial finance
period, a common occurrence for payday loans.
The primary purpose of disclosing APRs is to provide a standard-
ized price tag that allows consumers to compare their options.
2 1 A
payday loan with a 480% APR really is nineteen times more expensive
than a credit card loan with a twenty-five percent APR and sixty times
more expensive than a home loan with an eight percent APR. Where
a loan is both small and short term, the finance charge that corre-
sponds to a 480% APR may seem reasonable (e.g., thirty-seven dollars
for a two-week $200 loan with a 480% APR).
122 But the finance
charge on a credit card would be cheap in comparison (e.g., two dol-
lars). 123 Furthermore, if the consumer paid his credit card bill in full
each month, this two-week loan would fall within his grace period and
118 Id.
119 Id. at 48.
120 The answer derives from the following formula:
$300 x 500% APR x 14/365 days = $57.53.
$300 x 25% APR x 14/365 days = $2.88.
$57.53 - $2.88 = $54.66.
121 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 603.
122 $200 x 480% APR x 14/365 days = $36.82.
123 $200 x 25% APR x 14/365 days = $1.92.
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would cost him nothing. Worse yet, this thirty-five dollar difference
compounds every two weeks so that a $200 payday loan that is rolled
over twice will cost the debtor $105 more than if he had used his
credit card. Although savings or credit cards may not be an option in
the short term, a consumer who understood how to make the above
comparisons would have a strong incentive to keep an open line of
credit in the future so that he would never again have to take out a
payday loan.
The second important function of the APR is to signal the risk to
the consumer of misjudging his ability to repay the loan within the
finance period. A consumer who takes out a high-rate short-term loan
may genuinely believe that he will be able to pay off the entire loan in
two weeks so that the cost of the loan will be limited to the stated
finance charge. However, there is always a risk that the consumer's
judgment about his ability to repay is wrong. The consumer may mis-
calculate his budget or be confronted with additional emergency ex-
penses the next week. Late fees, bounced check fees, and the
continued accrual of interest are the price that a consumer pays for
being wrong. The higher the APR, the greater the consequences of
the continued accrual of interest that results from delayed repayment.
Where a rational consumer realizes that there is a risk of default, the
consequences of default should factor into his cost-benefit analysis.
Because customers currently pay little attention to the APR as a signal
of the risk and consequences of default, they have a tendency to de-
mand more high-rate credit than they otherwise would.
The fact that consumers currently do not understand the risk of
payday loans is underscored by the fact that some consumers pur-
posely choose these loans over other available credit sources. Only
6.4% of payday loan customers responding to a CRC survey listed the
absence of all other alternatives as their primary reason for taking out
a payday loan. 124 According to a payday loan trade group, one reason
stated by customers for preferring payday loans despite their higher
cost is that these loans "discipline the consumer to make immediate
repayment," saving them from the burden of overwhelming credit
card debt.125 Allegedly, a few consumers even take out payday loans
despite having liquid assets because they fear they would not have the
discipline to replenish their savings once depleted.126 If these indus-
try claims are true, then the same consumers who appreciate the "re-
124 See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 51 tbl.5-23.
125 NAT'L CHECK CASHERS ASS'N, supra note 23, pt. II.
126 See ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 16.
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payment discipline" imposed by payday loans should also appreciate
governmental regulation.
1 27
The average consumer shows little understanding of the terms
used in TILA disclosures, which contributes to his misunderstanding
of the true cost and risks of various credit options. This lack of con-
sumer awareness makes it unlikely that borrowers are purchasing the
optimal amount or type of credit necessary to maximize their well-
being. 128 I propose three potential solutions to this problem: (1) fi-
nancial education, (2) better disclosure, and (3) rate regulation.
Our nation is in desperate need of financial education. Cur-
rently, only four states require students to complete a course that cov-
ers personal finance before graduating from high school.
129 In a 2004
study sponsored by the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial
Literacy, most high school seniors failed a financial literacy test, an-
swering only half of the questions correctly.
130 Jump$tart has adminis-
tered variations of this exam four times since 1998 with similar
results.'31 The combination of widespread financial ignorance and a
rapidly growing, largely unregulated credit market presents a danger-
ous mix.
Although financial education has the potential to improve under-
standing of current disclosures, its effectiveness is limited. First, soci-
127 Nearly three-fourths of payday loan customers surveyed by the CRC agreed
"the government should limit interest rates even if the limitations caused fewer con-
sumers to be able to get credit." Id. at 35.
128 See Peterson, supra note 83, at 883 ("Without accurate information about the
quality and especially the price of any good, no person can minimize their opportu-
nity costs, since they cannot compare the value of that product to their next best
option.").
129 NAT'L COUNCIL ON ECON. EDUC., SURVEY OF THE STATES: ECONOMIC AND PER-
SONAL FINANCE EDUCATION IN OUR NATION'S SCHOOLS IN 2002, at 4 (2002), available at
http://www.jumpstartcoalition.com/upload/NCEE
20 0 3.pdf. The four states requir-
ing financial education are Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky and New York. Id.
130 See News Release, Kristy Thomas, Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial
Literacy, Financial Literacy Improves Among Nation's High School Students 1 (Apr.
1, 2004), available at http://www.jumpstart.org/fileuptemp/FINALPRJump$tart_
2004_Survey.doc. The exam was administered to 4074 students in 215 schools across
the nation, id. at 2, and included thirty-one questions on the topics of income, money
management, saving and investment, and credit and spending. The exam and an-
swers can be accessed at http://www.jumpstartcoalition.com/upload/20
0 4% 2OSur-
vey%20with%20answers.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
131 Contrary to the title of the Jump$tart news release, test results were five per-
cent lower than when the survey was first conducted in 1997 and had only improved
0.3% over the prior year. See LEwis MANDELL, JUMP$TART COALITION FOR PERS. FIN.
LITERACY, OUR VULNERABLE YOUTH: THE FINANCIAL LITERACY OF AMERICAN 12TH GRAD-
ERS 9 (1998).
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ety may not have an opportunity to educate everyone who needs the
information. Second, not all consumers who currently lack the skills
necessary to analyze TIIA disclosures have the capacity and aptitude
to develop them. 32 Converting dollars to percentages and back again
may present a challenge, especially when rates are subject to change
(e.g., introductory teaser rates, penalty rates). In addition to consider-
ing the finance charge and APR, consumers must determine the rela-
tive importance of the minimum finance charges, late fees,
insufficient fund fees, and over-limit fees, and then factor these into
their rate analysis.
A second alternative is to improve disclosure. If fringe creditors
were required to make disclosures that would pass muster under prod-
ucts liability law, these disclosures would look far different than TILA
currently requires. Imagine a hazard sign followed by the message:
WARNING! Intended for emergency use only. Consult other credi-
tors before signing. CAUTION! Over half of customers at this store
had three or more rollovers last year, costing them a minimum of
$60 for each $100 borrowed. 133
While I do not suggest that products liability law actually be ex-
tended to financial products, I believe legislators should take a lesson
from this body of law in designing disclosures. The timing of disclo-
sures must also be improved if they are to be effective. One option
would be to require creditors to include price disclosures in all adver-
tisements, or to have a state-sponsored website where consumers
could access the price information and disclosures for all licensed
lenders.
Although relying upon disclosure coupled with education to pro-
tect consumers has an intuitive appeal, there are several weaknesses in
this approach. First, too much disclosure will be ignored, and no
amount of disclosure will help those in duress (i.e., those who are
faced with an emergency and no credit alternatives). Second, lenders
can use oral statements to undermine written disclosures. It is easier
to police the terms of a loan than the conversations between lenders
and customers. Third, disclosure may have little effect in counteract-
ing the strong consumer desire for immediate consumption, which is
132 See Morris, supra note 100, at 173 ("Incapacitation may also cause the borrower
to misestimate risks in the credit bargaining process. Providing information will not
help borrowers who are unable to participate in the bargaining process .... ").
133 See ELLIE AUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 39 tbl.5-1 1 (showing that 53.7%
of customers surveyed had three or more rollovers).
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reinforced daily by countless advertisements. 1 -
4 For these reasons,
rate regulation is necessary for full protection.
In recent years, the ability of private individuals to aid in the en-
forcement of TILA through class actions has declined due to the in-
creased use of mandatory arbitration clauses that prohibit class
actions.1 35 If Congress is going to continue to rely on disclosure as its
primary mode of consumer protection, it should seriously consider
amending TILA to specify that the right to class action is unwaivable
to facilitate actions by private attorneys general.
C. Why the Market Will Not Correct Itself. Obstacles to Competition in the
Fringe Credit Market
1. Incentives to Avoid'Price Competition
Theoretically, interest rates will drop and industry growth will
subside once supply is sufficient to meet demand and competition
amongst lenders begins to drive down profits. Even if TILA disclo-
sures are ineffective, the barriers to market entry are low and creditors
are free to advertise their prices, which should spark competition.
Unfortunately, fringe creditors have compelling reasons not to adver-
tise prices, which in turn limits competition.
The primary reason that fringe creditors are reluctant to compete
on price is that TILA requires all credit advertisements that include
price to include the APR.13 6 A lender cannot advertise that his fees
are two dollars lower than his competitor without also advertising that
his fees still correspond to a 400% APR. Such an advertisement would
likely draw attention and criticism from a wide array of citizens who
are currently oblivious to the rates charged by fringe creditors. In
addition, the advertisements may inadvertently educate customers
about the size of the price gap between the prime and fringe market.
A 400% APR viewed by itself in a loan office may not raise warning
bells for a customer. But if that same customer saw that APR in the
privacy of his own home, he might compare it to the credit card solici-
tations he received in the mail and be persuaded to avoid these loans
in the future. Lenders avoid these dangers by focusing their advertise-
ments on convenience, speed, and credit availability.
134 See Wallace, supra note 57, at 473 (noting that consumer counseling is rarely
effective "because of the strong consumer biases in favor of immediate gratification
and an unwillingness to take full account of future hardship and risk").
135 See supra Part III.A.2 for a description of how arbitration clauses inhibit con-
sumers from bringing unconscionability and fraud claims.
136 15 U.S.C. § 1664(d) (2000).
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Although lenders do not compete on price, they still have a
strong incentive to fight for market share. The two primary ways in
which payday lenders compete are through risk tolerance and conve-
nience. Although risk tolerance plays a critical role in allowing the
payday loan industry to compete with other types of credit, its role in
differentiating payday lenders is limited. Once a lender has agreed
not to look at the customer's credit history, it cannot do much more
to lower its standards. Eliminating the job or bank account require-
ment would cause bad debt and collection expenses to skyrocket. The
remaining options are to lend a larger percentage of the customer's
anticipated income, stack one loan on top of another, or allow the
continuous rollover of loans. A customer who cannot obtain an addi-
tional rollover from one payday lender may then go to a second "more
competitive" lender to obtain a loan to pay off the first. Unfortu-
nately, these are all factors that increase the likelihood of getting
caught in a debt trap that ends in bankruptcy.
The second factor through which payday lenders compete is con-
venience. Because lenders offer nearly identical products, have simi-
lar risk tolerances, and do not advertise prices, convenience of store
locations and store hours become the deciding factors for many con-
sumers.137 Unfortunately, convenient access to loans that are not in-
tended for frequent use and that are difficult to repay encourages
irresponsible use of these products.
2. Governmental Support of the Noncompetitive RAL Market
The market for RALs is unique in that it is directly tied to the
market for tax preparation services and tax preparation is mandated
by the federal government. Tax preparers need not (and rarely do)
advertise prices for RALs or tax preparation to attract customers. In-
stead, they advertise convenience, reliability, and the ability to obtain
refunds quickly. Many consumers will choose their RAL provider
based exclusively on who they trust to do their taxes. Others will focus
on who can get their money to them fastest. By the time taxpayers
learn the price for this speed, it is too late to take their business else-
137 Three out of five borrowers surveyed by the CRC listed "quick, easy process" as
the most important reason for choosing a payday loan over another loan source. See
ELLIEHAUSEN & LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 51 tbl.5-23. Another 10.9% based their
decision on convenient location. Id. Strangely, only 6.4% claimed that their choice
was based on having "no other alternative." Id. If true, this bolsters the argument
that consumers do not understand the relative cost of credit sources.
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where. 138 RAL providers can then charge monopoly prices for these
loans.
The traditional justification for allowing creditors of small loans
to charge a higher rate of interest is the increased transaction costs
and risk of default that accompany such loans. Yet neither factor ex-
plains the high loan fees charged for RALs. Providers typically pass
transaction costs along to RAL customers in the form of separate ad-
ministrative, application, document preparation, or electronic filing
fees. These loan fees and processing fees are piled on top of substan-
tial tax preparation fees, which already compensate the preparer for
collecting most of the information needed to process the loan applica-
tion. 139 Because transaction costs are covered by these separate fees,
the loan fee should be based entirely on the time value of money
(which is negligible for a one week loan) and on risk.
Ironically, the risk of default for a RAL is relatively low. Unlike
traditional loans, RALs do not require borrowers to take any action on
the loan's due date. The RAL agreement signed by each taxpayer au-
thorizes the preparer to have the tax refund directly wired from the
IRS to the bank that extended the loan, giving the consumer no op-
portunity to default. 140 The only risks the bank faces are that the re-
fund was incorrectly calculated, the taxpayer has a lien on his
refund,14 1 or the return is fraudulent. To counteract the first two
risks, RAL providers typically delay loan approval for up to two days.
142
If an electronically filed return contains an error, such as a transposed
social security number, the IRS will notify the preparer within forty-
eight hours. 143 E-filed returns that survive this filter are over ninety-
nine percent accurate. 144 This service deters fraudulent returns, be-
cause a would-be swindler must not only risk severe federal penalties
and produce fake W-2s, but also provide valid social security numbers
138 See supra Part III.B.I for discussion of why comparison shopping is nearly im-
possible in the RAL market.
139 The average preparation fee for each U.S. customer was $133 in 2004. H&R
BLOCK, INC., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2005) (reporting $2,119,772 in preparation
fees for 15,903 returns), available at http://media.corporate-ir.net/media-files/NYS/
HRB/reports/AR2004.pdf.
140 Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 614 (noting that the lender has a right of
setoff against the refund and that the boilerplate language of RAL contracts also may
contain a right of setoff for debts owed to affiliates of the lender).
141 Tax liens are equivalent to the Financial Management System debts described
infra note 145.
142 BERUBE ET AL., supra note 31, at 4.
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and birth dates that have not yet been run through the e-file system
that tax year. In addition to testing return accuracy, the IRS's Debt
Indicator program allows creditors to find out, within forty-eight
hours, whether any tax liens exist on the taxpayer's refund. 145 Credi-
tors cannot entirely avoid the risk that a government agency other
than the IRS has a lien on the taxpayer's refund because not all such
liens are reported through the Debt Indicator. 146 If a taxpayer's re-
fund is offset, however, he remains liable for repaying the difference
between the amount of his RAL and the actual refund received by the
bank. In conclusion, RALs present only minimal risks, which cannot
justify charging triple-digit interest rates in addition to loan adminis-
trative fees.
TV. THE ROUTE TO FEDERAL PREEMPTION
How did credit regulation become so permissive? The answer is
federal preemption. Traditionally, consumer protection and usury re-
strictions were considered the province of the states. During the last
twenty-five years, however, federal control has increased significantly.
Understanding this progression is important for two reasons. First, it
explains how usury law devolved into its current state. Second, it high-
lights an obstacle that state legislatures must overcome if they wish to
pass effective regulations protecting consumers.
A. Marquette and the Rise of the Exportation Doctrine
The preemption of state usury law began with the National Bank
Act of 1864.147 Section 85 currently provides that a national bank may
charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory,
or District where the bank is located, or at a rate of 1 per centum in
excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper .. ..
whichever may be the greater."'148 Since 1873, courts have interpreted
this language as conferring "most-favored lender" status on national
banks, which allows the banks to apply the highest rate allowed by the
145 Id. The Debt Indicator signals whether the taxpayer owes a debt to the IRS or
one of the agencies managed by the Financial Management System (FMS), which may
be offset against the refund. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 103, at 85. FMS
debts "are for past due student loans, child support, Federal taxes, state taxes, or
other governmental agency debts." Id.
146 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 103, at 49.
147 National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 108, 108 (current version
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)). Note that it is common practice to refer to § 85 of
the National Bank Act, even though § 85 refers to the statute's location in the code,
not the original bill.
148 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
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state for any lender authorized to make similar loans, regardless of
whether that lender is a state bank.'
49
The full importance of § 85 of the National Bank Act was not felt
until 1978, when the Supreme Court determined that a bank is "lo-
cated" in the state where it is chartered. 50 Accordingly, in Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., the Court held that § 85
authorizes a national bank to charge all of its customers the maximum
interest rate permitted by the law of the state where it is chartered
even if that rate would otherwise be considered usurious under the
state law of the bank's nonresident customers.15 1 The Court fully ac-
knowledged that "the 'exportation' of interest rates" authorized by its
decision could "significantly impair the ability of States to enact effec-
tive usury laws."1 52 However, the Court left it up to Congress to make
any changes it deemed fit, noting "the protection of state usury laws is
an issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter § 85 to further that
end is better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judg-
ment of this Court.
' 153
Soon after the Supreme Court decided Marquette, states began a
race to the bottom, competing for national bank charters by loosen-
ing their usury restrictions. Delaware and South Dakota were two of
the first states to eliminate restrictions on credit card lending, and
both were amply rewarded in the form of increased tax revenue from
bank charters. 154 Banks around the country used the threat of re-
chartering to pressure their state legislatures into relaxing rate regula-
149 See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314
(1978) (citing Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1873)). The
Missouri law at issue in Tiffany limited state banks to eight percent interest, but al-
lowed individuals to charge ten percent. Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 409, 411 (1873). The Court concluded that Congress's intent was not only to
level the playing field, but also to give federal banks a competitive advantage over all
other lenders, so that they would be "National favorites." Id. at 413; see KEEST &
RENUART, supra note 5, at 78 (describing the history of the "most-favored lender"
doctrine).
150 Marquette, 439 U.S. at 310. The Court noted that "congressional debates sur-
rounding the enactment of [§ 85] were conducted on the assumption that a national
bank was 'located' for purposes of the section in the State named in its organization
certificate." Id.
151 Id. at 313.
152 Id. at 318.
153 Id. at 319.
154 See KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, at 82-83 n.144. South Dakota experienced
a 900% increase in tax revenue from banks between 1980 and 1987. Id. (citing Small
Is Usurious, ECONOMIST,July 2, 1988, at 26). During this same period, Delaware's reve-
nue increased even more dramatically, from $2.4 million to forty million dollars. Id.
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tion. 15 5 Faced with this threat and the knowledge that their own laws
were powerless to protect their citizens from loans made by out-of-
state banks, many states softened their usury restrictions to prevent an
exodus of card-issuing banks. Currently, the least restrictive states
provide that lenders may charge any amount of interest and fees on
consumer loans so long as the parties agree. 1 56 Nine states currently
take this approach.
1 57
B. Congressional Expansion of Federal Preemption
Following Marquette, Congress has twice passed legislation that ex-
panded the reach of the exportation doctrine. The Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA),' 15 8 was enacted in response to (1) concerns that the Mar-
quette decision had placed state-chartered banks at a competitive disad-
vantage to federal banks1 59 and (2) a credit crunch caused by the
clash of record-high inflation and state interest rate ceilings that did
not float with inflation.1 60 DIDMCA extended the benefits of the Na-
tional Bank Act-including the ability to export interest rates across
155 See Christopher C. DeMuth, The Case Against Credit Card Interest Rate Regulation,
3 YALEJ. ON REG. 201, 215-16 (1986) (explaining that Citibank moved its operations
to South Dakota after unsuccessfully lobbying the New York legislature to remove
usury limits).
156 The language of South Dakota's statute section 54-3-1.1, entitled "Rate of inter-
est set by written agreement-no maximum or usury restriction," is illustrative of this
approach:
Unless a maximum interest rate or charge is specifically established else-
where in the code, there is no maximum interest rate or charge, or usury
rate restriction between or among persons, corporations, limited liability
companies, estates, fiduciaries, associations, or any other entities if they es-
tablish the interest rate or charge by written agreement.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 54-3-1.1 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003).
157 The nine states are Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, app. A, at
557. Note that Montana allows "regulated lenders" (i.e., banks, credit unions, and
similar entities) to charge any rate the borrower agrees to, MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-5-
301 (2003), but it limits nonbank licensed payday lenders to a fee of twenty-five per-
cent of the check. Id. § 31-1-112. The other eight states listed, as well as Nevada and
New Hampshire, place no interest or fee restrictions on licensed payday lenders. See
Fox, supra note 11, at 31-33.
158 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-221, §§ 521-523, 94 Stat. 132, 164-66 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831d,
14 6 3 (g), 1 7 85(g) (2000)).
159 Id. § 521, 94 Stat. at 164 (stating that the Act's purpose is "to prevent discrimi-
nation against State-charted insured banks ... with respect to interest rates").
160 KEEST & RENUART, supra note 5, at 92 n.229.
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state lines and to charge the alternative federal ceiling (one percent
in excess of the discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper) -to all
federally insured state banks, savings and loans, and credit unions.
61
The resulting expansion in federal preemption was startling-over
ninety percent of all banks are federally insured.
162
In 1994, Congress dealt an additional blow to state law by passing
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
(Riegle-Neal),163 which gave national banks and federally insured
state banks the power to branch across state lines. 164 Prior to this Act,
state law controlled the ability of banks to branch and generally pro-
hibited interstate branching. Thus, when the Supreme Court decided
Marquette and Congress passed DIDMCA, most banks had a physical
presence in only one state-the state where they were chartered. This
limited the exportation doctrine to banking that could be conducted
through the mail (i.e., credit cards), and required that banks actually
relocate to take advantage of permissive laws outside their home
states. Riegle-Neal broadened the exportation doctrine by allowing
banks to establish a physical presence in multiple states and by specify-
ing that the host states' laws would not apply to national banks unless
these laws fit into one of four categories and survived federal preemp-
tion. 165 Where these conditions were not met, national banks could
161 Congress modeled the statutory language of section 521 of DIDMCA after § 85
of the National Bank Act. Courts have construed section 521 as providing the same
benefits to federally insured state banks that federal banks receive under § 85. See
Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992) ("The histor-
ical record clearly requires a court to read the parallel provisions of [DIDMCA] and
the Bank Act in pari materia."); Robert C. Eager & C.F. Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemp-
tion and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING
INST. 21, 41-42 (2004).
162 BENJAMINJ. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING: A HISTORY 142 (1990).
163 Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
§§ 101-102, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339-43 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1842(d), 1831u(a) (1)
(2000)).
164 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a) (1) (2000) ("Beginning onJune 1, 1997, the responsi-
ble agency may approve a merger transaction under section 1828(c) of this title be-
tween insured banks with different home States, without regard to whether such
transaction is prohibited under the law of any State." (emphasis added)); Eager & Muck-
enfuss, supra note 161, at 44 (explaining that Riegle-Neal "reversed national policy
dating from the Jackson era that the states should determine where banks may estab-
lish branches").
165 Riegle-Neal provides that "[t]he laws of the host State regarding community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate
branches shall apply to any branch in the host State of an out-of-State national
bank... except-(i) when Federal law preempts the application of such State laws to
a national bank." 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (1) (A). Despite being couched in deferential lan-
guage, this provision automatically preempted the application of all state laws that did
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apply the laws of their home state to branch offices they established in
foreign states. Although Riegle-Neal originally left the interstate
branches of state banks subject to host state law, 166 the Act was
amended in 1997 to give state banks the same ability as national banks
to disregard host state law.
16 7
C. Administrative Expansion of the Exportation Doctrine
Interpretations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) after Riegle-Neal's passage have given banks extreme
flexibility in choosing the state law they wish to apply. A national bank
is now considered to be located in both its home state and any state
where it has a branch. 168 For each loan, banks are instructed to apply
the law of the state where the loan is "made." Making a loan includes
three functions: approval, extension of credit, and disbursement of
funds. 169 If all three are performed in a single branch office, the na-
tional bank must apply the usury law of the branch state. If the func-
tions are split between locations, however, the national bank can elect
to apply the law of its home state or that of the branch, as long as the
loan has "a clear nexus" to the branch state. 170 Lenders who wish to
avoid applying branch state law can easily manipulate the loan transac-
tion to accomplish this goal. For instance, where the approval of a
loan is determined by "non-discretionary criteria that will be applied
mechanically," the loan is deemed to be "approved" at the location
where those non-discretionary criteria were chosen, no matter where
they are later applied.1
71
A bank's ability to export the state law of its choosing does not
stop with numeric interest rates, but rather extends to a laundry list of
fees that fit within the OCC's definition of interest. In Smiley v. Ci-
tibank (South Dakota), N.A., 172 the Supreme Court found the definition
not fit into one of the four listed categories and left those categories subject to federal
preemption. See Eager & Muckenfuss, supra note 161, at 45.
166 See Eager & Muckenfuss, supra note 161, at 47-48.
167 Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j) (1) ("The laws of a host State ... shall apply to any
branch in the host State of an out-of-State State bank to the same extent as such State
laws apply to a branch in the host State of an out-of-State national bank.").
168 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Ltr. 822, at 3 (Feb. 17,
1998), reprinted in KATHLEEN E. KEEST & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., THE COST OF CREDIT: REGULATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES CD-ROM (2d. ed.
supp. 2003).
169 Id. at 14.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 12.
172 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
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of interest as used in the National Bank Act ambiguous and held it
should therefore defer to the judgment of the OCC, the agency
charged with enforcement of the banking laws. 173 In response to the
pending Smiley litigation, 174 the OCC had drafted the following pro-
posed regulation, defining interest as
any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an
extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any de-
fault or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was
extended. It includes, among other things, the following fees con-
nected with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic
rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees . . . , overlimit fees,
annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees.
175
Ironically, the definition of "interest" chosen by the OCC is much
broader than the definition of "finance charge" used in TILA. Banks
are therefore able to export high fees from their home state that they
are not required to include in the calculation of the APR for a loan.
Although the OCC's definition of interest is currently beyond legal
challenge, this discrepancy should make the definition suspect from a
policy perspective.
D. Charter Renting: Expanding the Exportation Beyond Banks
Exemption from state usury law does not stop with banks. Any
entity can potentially take advantage of lax usury law by contracting
with a bank in a creditor-friendly state. This practice, known as "char-
ter renting," is illustrated by the facts of Krispin v. May Department
Stores Co. 176 In 1996, a Missouri-based department store assigned all of
its credit card accounts to the May National Bank of Arizona, a wholly
owned subsidiary it had recently created.' 77 The store sent letters to
customers informing them of the change in account ownership. The
bank then promptly raised late fees to a level that was illegal under
Missouri usury law. Each night, pursuant to a contractual agreement
with the bank, the store purchased a 100% interest in the bank's re-
ceivables, which transferred the entire risk and reward of the loans to
the store. The store continued to play an active role in collection and
marketing efforts. 178 Ignoring the purpose and economic substance
of this arrangement, the Eighth Circuit held that because the bank
173 Id. at 739.
174 Id. at 740.
175 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a) (2004).
176 218 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000).
177 Id. at 921.
178 Id. at 921-22.
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originated the loans, Arizona law should determine the legality of the
fees. 179 The court relied on the Fifth Circuit's statement in FDIC v.
Lattimore Land Corp.180 that the "non-usurious character of a note
should not change when the note changes hands," 181-a rule with a
pedigree dating back to 1833.182
In Cades v. H & R Block, Inc.,18 3 the Fourth Circuit allowed the
extension of the exportation doctrine to RALs. Even though the de-
fendant H&R Block office solicited customers, assisted them in com-
pleting loan documents, and disbursed the loan checks, 184 the Court
found the decision to approve the loan was made by Beneficial Na-
tional Bank in Delaware and that the loans would therefore be judged
by lenient Delaware law. 185 Tax preparers now make ample use of
charter renting and the exportation doctrine. 186 RALs are too large
to fall under the protection of most payday loan statutes,187 but too
expensive to be permitted by most "small loan" laws.1 88 Furthermore,
the IRS explicitly forbids tax preparers from making RALs directly or
through a related financial institution, which forces preparers to part-
ner with other lenders.
1 8 9
179 Id. at 924.
180 656 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1981).
181 Id. at 148-49. In Lattimore, the court held that a loan that was originated by a
state bank would not be subject to the usury provisions of the National Bank Act if it
was later assigned to a national bank. Id. at 147. National banks could therefore
accept assignment of loans that had been legally made by an out-of-state bank even if
the loans carried rates or charges that exceeded those allowed by the national banks'
home states. Id.
182 See Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 109 (1833) (stating that one of the
"cardinal rules in the doctrine of usury" was that "a contract, which, in its inception, is
unaffected by usury, can never be invalidated by any subsequent usurious
transaction").
183 43 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1994).
184 Id. at 873.
185 Id.
186 See Drysdale & Keest, supra note 9, at 612-13.
187 The payday loan laws of twenty-six states prohibit loans greater than $500. See
Fox, supra note 11, at 31-33.
188 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.530 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (allowing small
loans up to $15,000, but limiting interest to three percent per month for the first
$1000 and two percent for the excess). If RAL providers were forced to comply with
this law, they would be limited to charging ten dollars for a ten day $1000 loan.
189 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 103, at 51 ("An Authorized IRS e-file
Provider that is also the return preparer, and the financial institution or other lender
that makes a RAL cannot be related taxpayers within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.]
§ 267 or § 707.").
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Nonbank payday lenders likewise use charter renting extensively
to avoid state regulation, 190 although the practice is likely to wane as
more states enact payday loan laws that explicitly permit high rates
1 9 1
and federal bank regulators show increased hostility to payday lend-
ers. In recent years, the OCC has cracked down on selected types of
charter renting that it considers dangerous to national banks. In a
November 2000 bulletin, the OCC warned that "payday lending car-
ries significant credit, transaction, reputation, and compliance and le-
gal risks that raise supervisory concerns."
1 92 The OCC expressed
specific concern over "[c]ontractual agreements with third parties
that originate, purchase, or service payday loans,"
19 3 noting that the
risk of contracting with these parties "can be excessive if management
and directors do not exercise ... effective oversight and controls."
19 4
Despite the warnings, national banks continued to exercise little
or no supervision over their payday lending partners. This lack of su-
pervision, coupled with the frequent legal transgressions of payday
lenders, 9 5 led the OCC to commence enforcement proceedings
against national banks, forcing them to end their partnerships with
payday lenders. By the end of 2003, the OCC had terminated all ex-
isting partnerships. 1 96 Note that the OCC's opposition to charter
renting stems from the danger it poses to the safety and soundness of
banks, not from a belief that such "lending activities [are] unlawful as
a general matter."197 Accordingly, the OCC has never attacked char-
ter renting arrangements between national banks and RAL providers.
190 As of March 2004, eleven of the thirteen largest payday lenders used charter
renting to make loans in at least some states. Fox, supra note 11, at 14.
191 See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of why the exporta-
tion doctrine gives states an incentive to pass legislation permitting payday lending if
they want to have any control over it.
192 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Advisory Ltr. 2000-10, at 3 (Nov. 27,
2000), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/
2 0 00 -10.doc.
193 Id.
194 Id. (quoting Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Advisory Ltr. 2000-9
(Aug. 29, 2000)).
195 The case of Eagle National Bank illustrates the typical circumstances that led to
regulatory action. The OCC found Eagle's partner, Dollar Financial Group, "failed to
consistently follow the bank's underwriting criteria, violated federal law relating to
privacy notices and Truth in Lending disclosures, and opened stores in some states
and began originating payday loans without the bank's knowledge or approval." Fox,
supra note 11, at 17.
196 Schiltz, supra note 5, at 593; see also Fox, supra note 11, at 16 ("As a result of
enforcement actions, no federally chartered bank or thrift rents its charter to payday
lenders.").
197 Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002 WL 1205060, at
*6 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (upholding the legal validity of a charter renting arrange-
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The impact of the OCC enforcement actions on the ability of pay-
day lenders to evade state law has thus far been negligible. Each of
the payday loan companies that lost its national bank partner subse-
quently found refuge in a state-chartered bank regulated by the
FDIC.198 Although the FDIC warns banks that failure to properly
manage relationships with payday loan providers presents substantial
risks, the agency's recently issued guidelines do not prohibit charter
renting and are generally considered amenable to the practice.1 99 A
significant portion of the payday loan industry, including eleven of
the thirteen largest lenders, partners with FDIC-regulated banks to
make loans in at least some states. 200
E. Lack of Notice and Accountability: Problems with the Current Usury
Law and Proposals for Reform
The combined effect of the National Bank Act, Marquette,
DIDMCA, Riegle-Neal, and recent OCC interpretations is that states
are preempted from applying their own law towards the protection of
their citizens anytime a loan is made by a federally insured depository
institution (or an entity that has a contractual partnership with one)
that is not chartered within that state. Federal law defers to the judg-
ment of the state where the lender bank is chartered or operating a
branch, which effectively allows lenders to choose their own law. The
lenders that wish to make questionable loans are also the ones most
likely to search out the state with the least restrictive banking law.
Therefore, as long as one state in the Union places no restrictions on
usury, that is the law that will apply to all predatory lenders.
This system of federal preemption, which preempts the usury
laws of most states while leaving the decision of what should replace
them up to the least restrictive state legislatures, is objectionable for
two reasons. First, it eliminates accountability. Consumers are af-
fected by laws made in a state where they have no representation and
no ability to vote lawmakers out of office. The state leaders in permis-
sive credit regulation earn the bulk of charter revenue, but must deal
with only a small portion of the costs created by their decision. The
creditor-friendly laws of South Dakota, one of the least populous
ment between Goletta National Bank and Ace Cash Express after the OCC had al-
ready issued an order requiring Eagle National Bank to end a similar arrangement).
198 Fox, supra note 11, at 14 (listing payday lenders that are currently partnered
with FDIC-insured banks).
199 See FDIC Guidelines for Payday Lending, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-
127 (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday; Fox,
supra note 11, at 19-20.
200 Fox, supra note 11, at 14.
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states, get to trump those of California and New York. Meanwhile,
Congress gets to pretend that it is deferring to state law, while it is
really deferring to the will of the banking industry and abrogating the
law of the citizens of a majority of states. Second, the current system is
deceptive. Consumers are lulled into a false sense of security by the
erroneous belief that the laws of their home state are available to pro-
tect them. Ironically, the states where citizens have lobbied for restric-
tive usury law are the states least likely to have their own law applied to
loans made within their borders.
20 1
Despite the expansive scope of federal preemption, state usury
law remains important in at least two respects. First, state usury laws
continue to apply to depository institutions (i.e., banks, savings and
loans, credit unions) chartered within the state. Second, it continues
to apply to all creditors that are not depository institutions and are not
"charter renting" from one. Several states also attempt to prevent
charter renting by prohibiting licensed lenders from facilitating loans
for an out-of-state bank. The ability of such laws to withstand legal
challenge is uncertain, however, because federal law preempts the ap-
plication of state laws to national banks where such laws would "pre-
vent or significantly interfere with the national bank's exercise of its
powers. '20 2 Although these state laws do not purport to apply to na-
tional banks (i.e., they only apply to the national banks' potential
lending partners), they still significantly interfere with national banks'
activities.
The notice and accountability concerns presented by the current
state of the law can be addressed in two ways. First, Congress could
specify a maximum interest rate that applies to all federally insured
banks. Alternatively, Congress could amend the National Bank Act
and DIDMCA to specify that the law of the borrower's state (i.e., the
state where the borrower is a citizen) applies.
203 If national banks
201 See James A. White, The Usury Trompe l'Oeil, 51 S.C. L. Rrv. 445, 448 (2000)
(noting "the sternest state laws are the first to be undermined and the quickest to
fall").
202 Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). Recent OCC regulations have
taken an even more expansive view, claiming preemption of all state laws that would
"obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally
authorized... lending powers." Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending
and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1916 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4008 (d) (1)).
203 The law could also be amended to apply the laws of the state where the con-
sumer received the loan proceeds or filled out the application, although this is not
advisable. While this proposal would allow consumers more freedom to travel to
other states to obtain the loan they desired, it would be problematic for states that
chose to prohibit risky loans to control the cost of their welfare programs and bank-
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were not allowed to export their home state law, this would likely in-
crease transaction costs by forcing banks to monitor multiple state
laws and preventing them from using uniform policies, forms, and
marketing materials. However, these costs should not be overstated.
First, all businesses that conduct interstate business must monitor
state law developments. Second, the laws of many states overlap,
which cuts down on the number of necessary policy variations. Al-
lowing states to apply their own laws to loans involving their residents
would allow for valuable experimentation between the states. Citizens
could debate the tradeoffs between cost, protection, and credit availa-
bility in their state legislatures.
The purpose of this Note is not to take a side on the issue of
whether state or federal law should control, 204 but rather to implore
all legislatures to rethink their current credit law. If federal law is go-
ing to preempt state law, Congress should be responsible for choosing
that law rather than deferring to Delaware. Although it is admittedly
doubtful that Congress would be willing to adopt my proposed float-
ing interest rate ceiling of fifty percentage points above the one-
month treasury rate, it is equally doubtful that it would adopt the "no
limits" policy of the least restrictive states. As long as the exportation
doctrine and charter renting are allowed to continue, state law will be
influenced by the knowledge that any restrictive law will be
circumvented.
CONCLUSION
Thanks to an absence of effective rate regulation, the fringe
credit market continues to grow steadily. This Note has demonstrated
that much of the demand in this market is attributable to debtors who
are (1) trapped in a vicious debt cycle caused by the fringe credit mar-
ket itself, (2) under duress, and/or (3) misinformed about the costs
and risks of this credit. The heavy cost of fringe credit is borne not
only by debtors, but also by society, which must make provision for
ruptcy courts. Traveling to other states to get a loan is also wasteful, and there is no
reason to expect that individuals know the laws of the state where they take out a
short-term loan (even though we have a legal presumption that they do), especially if
they are traveling. Finally, this rule wouldn't work for credit cards, where the "loans"
are made in all different locations. Focusing on the law of the consumer's citizenship
solves these problems.
204 The benefits and drawbacks of having uniform federal law applied to national
banks, as compared to subjecting federal banks to state law, was debated in Congress
recently, following the OCC's issuance of Final Rules on National Bank Preemption.
For a summary of the Congressional debate, which took place January 28, 2004, see
Eager & Muckenfuss, supra note 161, at 32-36.
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bad debt expense and the welfare needs of citizens. In addition, mil-
lions of tax dollars are diverted each year from the low-income taxpay-
ers for whom they are intended into the hands of RAL providers.
The harms and market imperfections presented by fringe credit
can be addressed in a variety of ways, including improving financial
education; modifying disclosure laws to require that information be
provided earlier and tailored to consumers, allowing class arbitration
to enforce consumer protection laws, limiting the number of payday
loans a consumer can take out each year, and limiting the rates that
creditors may charge. While each of these approaches has some po-
tential, this Note has demonstrated that any solution that does not
include rate regulation is unlikely to be effective in protecting con-
sumers from unconscionable, predatory loans.
In addition to providing vital protection to consumers, interest
rate ceilings are an effective and efficient means of limiting the costs
and risks that excessive indebtedness pose to society. In the absence
of government intervention, creditors and borrowers have little incen-
tive to consider these societal costs, which leads to an oversupply of
credit. Rate regulation can be used to restrict aggregate consumer
debt levels and discourage creditors from making excessively risky
loans. Rate regulation would also prevent RAL providers from taking
advantage of the inherently noncompetitive nature of this market to
charge excessive rates, and would reduce or eliminate the drain that
RALs currently impose on tax-based social welfare programs.
For all of these reasons, I advocate a return to rate regulation,
and propose a floating interest rate ceiling set at fifty percentage
points above the one-month treasury rate. For this proposal to be ef-
fective, the cooperation of Congress is needed to undo the current
system of preemption, rate exportation, and charter renting that
places the responsibility for rate regulation in the hands of the states
but hinders their ability to enforce these regulations.
2005]
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